Conference Welcome
Dear Conference Guests I warmly welcome to the Human Factors of Decision Making in Complex Systems Conference 2003! This conference hopes to provide a forum to examine a diverse range of approaches to decision making in complex systems.
The conference aims to address the role of the human, the technology and the processes in complex socio-technical and technological systems. We are pleased to welcome a wide range of participants from a diverse range of application areas, who will participate in this informal, friendly and engaging event, and contribute to the exciting topic area of the role of the human in relation to the system. We are proud to host this conference with sponsorship from the University of Abertay Dundee, US Navy ONR, USAF and the European Office of Aerospace Research and Development of the USAF On behalf of the organising committee, I would like to thank all those volunteers who have participated in creating and shaping this conference into a valuable experience for each and everyone of us.
We look forward to three days of dynamic activities, dialogue, and intellectual debate, and hope to encourage informal contacts and discussions amongst participants.
Conference Aim
To examine a diverse range of approaches to decision making in complex systems where there is a possibility of information overload, uncertainty, deception and error with a view to relating that to economic, industrial, commercial and military command and control information systems for management of complex systems.
Conference Outline
Many complex systems in civil and military operations are highly automated with the intention of supporting human performance in complex cognitive tasks. The complex systems can involve teams or individuals working on real-time supervisory control or command tasks where a number of constraints must be satisfied. This conference aims to address the role of the human, the technology and the processes in complex socio-technical and technological systems. It is hoped that a wide range of participants from a diverse range of application areas will participate in this meeting and the common issue will be the role of the human in relation to the system. Papers covering issues such as organizational influences on decision making, knowledge management, information visualization, decision-making, automation, situational awareness, team work, automation, intelligent aiding, cooperative tasking, cognitive task analysis, human error, software agency, problem solving, stress, workload, interface technologies, training decision-making and any other areas of human factors in decision making. It is hoped that submissions from ATC, weather forecasting, military C4I, the Stock Market, Incident Command, Emergency Services (Fire, Ambulance, and Police), complex supervisory control, transport (maritime or aerospace), commercial management and many other areas will contribute to the conference. Team, cognitive, design, technology and broad human factors issues will be addressed with a special section on military problems in Military Environments.
INTRODUCTION
The second Multi-National Limited Objective Experiment (MNLOE 2) explored how different information sharing strategies might influence an Operational Net Assessment (ONA) database. The nations were United States (US, lead), Australia (AU), Canada (CA), Germany (GE), United Kingdom (UK), and NATO. System of Systems Analysts (SoSAs) and military planners formed a Diplomatic/Military Command and Control (C2) organization. They interpreted Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) facts of a complex adverse state and entered them in the ONA database. Nations released sensitive facts to each other using "current" Bilateral (BL), Trilateral (TL), Multilateral (ML) agreements, and then "future" Coalition wide (COA) agreements. As transitions became more seamless, participants seemed to process information simultaneously in multiple workspaces. 
HF issues identified in this study

DISTRIBUTED PLANNING
It was suggested for MNLOE 2 that multiple nations might produce more robust plans than one nation. Alternatively, a single nation might produce a more robust plan than a coalition due to information sharing restrictions. However, MNLOE 2 was a peacetime scenario and there was no need for military planning. Thus, no military plan was produced for this event. Table 2 shows ONA activity. Because SoSAs are typically interested in Nodes (key players, organizations, and infrastructure) and Effects (desired outomes), and planners are typically interested in Actions and Resources, there was significantly less planning activity during the event.
MNLOE 2 did not have incentives to remain engaged in information sharing and distributed planning because 1) it was pre-crisis and by definition there is no need for action, 2) the desired effects may occur with the normal unfolding of time, and 3) national will and coalition intent needed to be clearly articulated so to justify any actions and resources.
TEAM DYNAMICS
Common intent and plans are key elements of team dynamics. Team members may have individual subobjectives but the plan ties them together. The team leader is another key element. The leader needs to have the right balance of legal and personal responsibility, legal and personal authority, and competency [5] . Thus, a leader who is competent may quickly gain personal authority and team members will be motivated to take on personal responsibility towards achieving a common intent through a common plan. co-location) ." The dimensions of common intent, co-location, and allegiance are critical elements for teams.
PROBLEM SOLVING
Innovative solutions not were required to solve problems in MNLOE 2. For example, national teams decided to share sensitive information by using an existing agreement, changing the agreement, deferring or retaining its release. Since the facts were unclassified, did not expose national vulnerabilities, or did not affect the ONA database, the decision was always to release using existing agreements.
CULTURAL ISSUES
An organization's culture and values are formulated over years, and are difficult to re-shape once formed. The fact that a coalition existed meant that their core values were similar.
Language was a strong cultural driver in this experiment. GE was the only non-native Englishspeaking participant, and yet all nations interpreted certain transmissions differently. Civilian vs. Military culture was evident. CA adopted a civilian model for meetings -that is collaboration, consensus, asking for volunteers, etc. However, military precision made the experiment progress. In summary, it was not clear what unique cultural issues emerged from the study. 
MULTIPLE AGENT INTERACTION
